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Between the founding of the Federal Reserve System in 1913 and the depression of the 1930s, three
check-clearing systems operated in the United States. The Federal Reserve cleared checks for members
of the system. Clearing houses cleared checks for members of their organizations. Correspondents
cleared checks for all other institutions. The correspondent-clearing system was vulnerable to counter-party
cascades, particularly because accounting conventions overstated reserves available to individual institutions
and the system as a whole. In November 1930, a correspondent system in the center of the United
States collapsed, causing the closure of more than one hundred institutions. Bank runs radiated from
the locus of events, and additional correspondent networks succumbed to the situation. For the remainder
of the contraction, banks that relied upon correspondents to clear checks failed at higher rates than
other banks. In sum, weaknesses within a check-clearing system played a hitherto unrecognized role
in the banking crises of the Great Depression.
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Introduction 
  During the Great Depression, banks failed in larger numbers than at any other time in 
United States history. Nearly one-third of the depository institutions in operation at the onset of 
the downturn disappeared during the contraction. Bank failures often occurred in clusters 
characterized as crises. The first crisis of the depression began in Tennessee in the fall of 1930 
and engulfed hundreds of banks in neighboring states. The final crisis began in Michigan in the 
winter of 1933, when to forestall runs on financial institutions, the governor ordered the state’s 
banks to suspend operations. Neighboring states followed Michigan’s example, igniting a chain 
reaction of state moratoria that forced President Roosevelt to declare a national banking 
‘holiday.’ 
  Economists have long debated the reasons for the banking system’s collapse. A 
traditional school of scholarship maintains that the underlying causes were withdrawals of 
deposits, illiquidity of assets, and the Federal Reserve’s reluctance to act (Friedman and 
Schwartz, 1963; Elmus Wicker, 1996). A contending school concludes that banks failed because 
the economy contracted. Asset prices fell. Loan default rates rose. Banks became insolvent. 
These fundamental forces accentuated a process of bank liquidation and that began during the 
1920s (Temin, 1976; Charles Calomiris and Joseph Mason, 2003). 
These opposing views exist for many reasons. A principal one is differences in data 
sources. Scholars in the traditional school analyze data aggregated at the national or regional 
level. This data reveals bank failures clustered in space and time, often coinciding with turning 
points in macroeconomic time-series such as indices of industrial production, the money supply, 
the money multiplier, interest rates, and the deflation rate. Narrative sources from the 1930s 
characterize these clusters as banking panics. Scholars in the second school analyze data at lower   2 
levels of aggregation, or disaggregated data consisting of samples of national banks, or panels of 
banks from within individual cities, states, or Federal Reserve districts. Eugene White (1984) 
pioneered this line of research by examining a panel of data drawn from national banks. The 
most recent and comprehensive work (Calomiris and Mason, 2003) analyzes a panel of data for 
all Federal Reserve member banks. These different data sources provide different perspectives 
on various segments of the banking industry, but none provides a comprehensive view of the 
causes of failure for all types of banks operating in the United States throughout the contraction 
of the early 1930s.  
This essay examines a new source of evidence that provides such a comprehensive 
perspective. The new source indicates the cause of suspension for all banks – including Federal 
Reserve members and nonmembers, national and state, incorporated and private – that suspended 
operations from the onset of the contraction in 1929 and until the national banking holiday in 
March 1933. The source comes from the archives of the Federal Reserve Board, whose Division 
of Bank Operations tracked changes in the status of all bank operating in the United States, 
analyzed the cause of each bank suspension, and recorded its conclusion and financial 
information for each bank on the St. 6386 series of forms. The complete series of St. 6386 forms 
survives in the National Archives of the United States (See Richardson (2005) for details). 
This new source indicates that check-clearing systems played a critical, but as of yet 
unnoted, role in the propagation of banking panics during the Great Depression. At that time, 
three check-clearing systems operated in the United States. The Federal Reserve cleared checks 
for members of the system. Clearing houses cleared checks for banks belonging to their 
organizations. Correspondents cleared checks for all other financial institutions.  
During November 1930, the failure of the Bank of Tennessee in Nashville, a principle   3 
correspondent for depository institutions in Tennessee and surrounding states, triggered a chain-
reaction. The ensuing collapse of its correspondent network forced more than one hundred banks 
to cease operations. Bank runs radiated from the locus of this counter-party cascade, forcing 
hundreds of additional banks to close their doors to depositors, and inducing most other banks in 
the affected regions to slow the conversion of deposits to currency through various mechanisms 
short of suspension. Several separate, smaller correspondent chains collapsed in the weeks that 
followed. Later surges in bank suspensions also disproportionately afflicted banks that cleared 
checks through correspondents. 
A comparison of the three check-clearing systems reveals reasons why correspondent 
networks collapsed like dominos at the onset of the banking crisis. Large banks providing 
correspondent services resembled central banks. Deposits in correspondents counted as a portion, 
usually the preponderance, of a client bank’s reserves. When a correspondent closed, these 
reserves disappeared, and the client bank had to suspend operations. If the client, in turn, had 
correspondents of its own, those banks had to suspend operations as well.  
A ubiquitous feature of pre-depression correspondent-clearing networks exacerbated the 
situation. To facilitate book-keeping, country banks treated checks working their way through 
the correspondent-clearing system as entering their reserve accounts immediately upon deposit, 
or if the checks were deposited through the postal system, at the time the checks were handed to 
the postmaster. Correspondents provided immediate credit on all items deposited by country 
clients. Checks traveling through the correspondent clearing system usually traveled through the 
hands of at least two banks before being redeemed at the bank on which they were drawn. The 
reserves of banks using the correspondent-clearing system consisted, therefore, partially of 
checks in transit, and this float was magnified by a multiple depending upon time in transit and   4 
the number of banks through which checks passed. 
Contemporary critics of the correspondent-clearing system called these reserves fictitious, 
since they consisted merely of book-keeping entries on the balance sheets of banks, and were 
not, in reality, backed by funds. Fictitious reserves peaked during the fall harvest season, when 
the flow of funds through correspondent networks to country banks and their agricultural clients 
peaked. Fictitious reserves also fluctuated with the behavior of bankers and the business cycle. 
Evidence indicates that the ratio of checks in transit relative to bankers’ balances, a measure of 
the share of reserves which were fictitious, rose rapidly during the 1920s and peaked in fall of 
1930, immediately preceding the onset of banking panics. 
The remainder of this essay documents these hitherto unrecognized facts and describes 
how they contributed to the collapse of the banking system during the Great Depression. Section 
1 describes the three check clearing systems that operated in the United States circa 1929. 
Section 2 describes the sources of evidence that reveal the connection between payment systems 
and bank distress. Section 3 illuminates the initial collapse of correspondent networks and their 
impact on banks in surrounding regions. Section 4 illustrates the fate of correspondent networks 
later during the depression. Section 5 discusses the implications of these findings. The collapse 
of correspondent networks played a hitherto unrecognized role in the banking crises of the 
1930s. 
 
Section 1: The Three Check Clearing Systems 
Around the turn of the twentieth century, checks became the predominant method of 
payment in local and long-distance trade. In response to the vast volume of payment orders 
presented at financial institutions, bankers established systems for routing checks from banks in 
which they were deposited to banks on which they were drawn. Three such check clearing   5 
systems operated in the United States at the onset of the Great Depression. 
The first system consisted of clearing houses. A clearing house was an association 
created by banks doing business in one locality to provide a uniform and convenient method of 
exchanging checks and settling balances on a daily basis. The association was governed by a 
constitution and a set of regulations adjudicated by an elected committee. Membership was 
voluntary. A bank joined a clearing house by depositing with the organization either cash or 
securities at a fixed ratio either to their capital stock or their deposits. In return, the bank received 
certificates issued by the organization and used to pay daily balances due to other banks 
belonging to the association. To settle accounts, representatives of each bank arrived at the 
clearing house each day at a designated hour, usually in the morning, presented items for 
collection at other banks, received claims against their own bank, checked to determine which 
items presented for collection would be rejected if presented at a teller’s window (e.g. “not 
sufficient funds,” “payment stopped,” “improperly endorsed,” etc.), ascertained the amounts due 
each bank, and finally, issued the appropriate certificates of debit and credit. 
As clearing houses gained experience with their primary function of facilitating check 
transactions among members, their members realized that they could utilize the organizations to 
attain other goals. One common goal was the quick, safe, and inexpensive settlement of 
transactions with institutions outside the organization. All banks accepted for deposit checks 
drawn on banks beyond their town’s limits. Rather than redeeming these items individually, via 
messengers or through the mail, which could be a time consuming and expensive process, 
particularly for items of low value, for which the cost of redemption could exceed the amount of 
remuneration, the clearing house gathered together all checks that members of the clearing house 
wished to clear from banks around the nation, and then processed and forwarded those checks   6 
collectively. The joint processing of checks economized on labor, postage, and exchange 
charges.  
In the 1890s, the Boston Clearing House was the first organization to establish such a 
system for the ‘collection of country items.’  It eventually reduced the expense of redemption to 
a nominal amount, less than seven cents per thousand dollars. By 1913, almost all banks in New 
England participated in the Boston clearing system, enabling their checks to circulate freely 
throughout the region, and enabling them to settle outstanding balances with a single, daily 
remittance to the clearing house (Talbert 1913 pp. 204-206). Under the system, Boston banks 
received at par checks from all New England banks. The Boston clearing house received, 
recorded, and forwarded the items for collection to the institutions on which they were drawn. 
Members of the Boston Clearing House received at par credit for the items on the second day 
following their dispatch. The Kansas City Clearing House, which adopted such a system in 1905, 
cut the costs of collection in half within 5 years (Young 1910, see also Preston 1920 p. 568). The 
Detroit Clearing House had a similar experience (Preston 1920 p. 568). In 1912, the New York 
Clearing House, which had begun regulating collection terms on country checks in 1898, 
established a system for clearing checks from the states of New York, New Jersey, 
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut. In 1913, the bankers of St. Louis approved a 
similar plan. 
Another common goal was maintaining depositors’ confidence in the soundness of local 
banks. Bankers recognized that “no bank can be in an unsound position without hurt to the whole 
local banking community (Young 1910 p. 608).” To detect instances of unsound banking, to 
restore confidence during unwarranted runs on individual institutions, and to affect remedies 
quicker than possible by state or national officials, clearing houses established examination   7 
bureaus. These bureaus monitored the balance sheets of banks belonging to the organization, 
audited institutions periodically, and promptly checked into reports of irregularities. Threatening 
to expel weak banks from the organization enabled “the clearing house as a body to exercise 
such supervision of any weak bank as to amount to a virtual taking over of its management till it 
is again in sound condition (Young 1910 p. 608).”
1 
A third common goal was the provision of liquidity, particularly during periods of panic, 
when depositors withdrew funds en masse, forcing banks to scramble for cash. In such 
circumstances, clearing houses eased the pressure on bank balance sheets by issuing clearing 
house certificates. These substitutes for currency circulated between banks and among their 
better customers, usually bigger businesses, alleviating the pressure to sell assets at depressed 
prices (Talbert 1913 p. 195). Clearing house members also pooled resources and raised cash in 
large quantities by borrowing from banks in central reserve cities, or taking lines of credit from 
financiers or industrialists, or accessing equity markets. Clearing houses used these funds to aid 
banks undergoing runs and to convince depositors that they could meet all contingencies.  
If all else failed, clearing houses coordinated temporary suspensions of payment, when all 
banks in a region ceased converting deposits into cash, until efforts to repair depositor’s 
confidence yielded results, and banks were able to reopen. Coordinated closures ensured that no 
bank suffered lasting stigma relative to its competitors for suspending payments in times of 
trouble. 
Clearing houses began operating in commercial centers in the United States during the 
                                                 
1   Note: Many clearing house examination bureaus also monitored borrowers within their communities, to detect 
duplications of borrowings by the same client at different banks, and to alleviate adverse selection among 
borrowers, by collecting detailed information on loan applicants, and disseminating it to all institutions, ensuring 
that borrowers could not refuse to provide information or security to an individual institution by threatening to 
borrow elsewhere. Young writes that “little has yet been said of the possibility of further development through 
such an office … with regard to the question of credit information (Young 1910 pp. 130-131).” Scattered 
historical accounts appear to indicate that clearing houses expanded their operations along such lines during the 
1910s and 1920s, but I have found no solid body of data on the practice.   8 
second half of the nineteenth century. Banks in New York City organized a clearing house 
association in October 1853. On October 11, the first day of operation, total clearings amounted 
to $22,648,109.87. The number of clearing houses grew rapidly during the second half of the 
century. By 1929, the year in which the Roaring 20s peaked and the stock market crashed, 
clearing houses operated in 349 municipalities in the United States. Each day, these associations 
cleared transactions totaling billions of dollars. At the New York Clearing House alone, daily 
clearings averaged $1,508,046,030.73 (Andrews 1942 pp. 587-588). 
Table 1 examines the distribution of clearing houses in the United States. In 1930, 
clearing houses operated in 45 of 48 states and the District of Columbia. Banks belonging to 
clearing houses numbered 2,186. These banks comprised 57.5% of the 3,805 banks located in 
clearing house cities. In the central reserve city of Chicago, 142 of 240 banks belonged to the 
clearing house. In the central reserve city of New York, only 34 of 222 banks belonged to the 
clearing house. 
Table 2 examines the distribution and characteristics of clearing houses with official 
examination bureaus. The preponderance of these bureaus existed in cities possessing a Federal 
Reserve district or branch bank. These cities were, of course, hubs of the financial industry. The 
banks within them often served as correspondents for country banks in the vicinity. 
The second check clearing system consisted of correspondent banks. Correspondents 
were banks with ongoing relationships facilitated by deposits of funds. The typical situation 
involved a bank outside a reserve city (called a country bank) that deposited funds in a bank in a 
reserve city (called a city bank) and received services in return. The cornerstone of the 
relationship was the clearing of checks. When a country bank received out-of-town checks from 
depositors, rather than mailing the checks directly to the banks on which they were drawn, the   9 
country bank deposited the checks in its city correspondent. The correspondent cleared the 
checks through the most convenient method, either through a clearing house, through the Federal 
Reserve System, or by directly contacting the institution on which the checks were drawn. 
Country banks found the services of city correspondents economical, because a correspondent 
enabled them to clear checks by making a small number of daily deposits via the United States 
postal service, rather than employing a staff of clerks to handle the volume of correspondence 
needed to send each check directly to bank of origination. Correspondent clearing also enabled 
country banks to avoid exchange charges, the fee that many banks charged for remitting 
payment for checks drawn on them not cashed over the counter. 
In addition to cashing checks, correspondents offered client banks an array of financial 
services. Correspondents supplied coins and currency, conducted wire transfers, facilitated 
investments in stocks and bonds, and offered investment advice. One of the most important 
services that correspondents offered was a line of credit. Correspondents routinely provided 
overdraft protection for their country clients and allowed clients to borrow against future flows 
of funds. Correspondents monitored the financial status of clients, enabling them to respond to 
clients’ requests for credit more quickly than could any other institution. Correspondents 
provided clients with access to domestic exchange markets, where banks bought, borrowed, 
loaned, and sold excess reserves deposited at correspondent banks in reserve cities. 
Domestic exchange markets existed in part because deposits with correspondents in 
reserve cities formed a portion of country banks’ legal reserves. The National Banking Act 
established a system in which all country banks held reserves in banks in reserve cities, and all 
banks in reserve cities held reserves in banks in the central reserve cities, New York and 
Chicago. Table 1 indicates the interstate distribution of reserve cities and shows that in 1930,   10 
almost all reserve cities contained clearing houses. State regulations conformed to this 
nationwide pyramiding of reserves, although in some states, state-chartered banks could hold 
reserves in designated banks within their state as well as reserve cities in other jurisdictions. 
On the eve of the Great Depression, correspondent networks formed a complex web of 
long-term interbank relationships anchored by banks in large commercial centers. A country 
bank often had a correspondent located in a nearby town, which was a member of the Federal 
Reserve, and therefore, could conveniently supply it with cash and clear many of its checks. A 
country bank also often possessed at least one correspondent in a financial center. The choice of 
correspondent depended on the needs of the respondent bank and its depositors. If the latter 
wished to invest in New York or international markets, than the country bank needed a New 
York correspondent who could handle those transactions. If the latter wished to invest in markets 
centered in Chicago, such as agricultural commodities, then the country bank needed a 
correspondent in Chicago. These incentives generated a system organized geographically. 
Regional financial centers, such as Boston, Cincinnati, Philadephia, San Francisco, and St. 
Louis, served banks in the surrounding states. St. Louis correspondents, for example, primarily 
served banks operating in Missouri and Arkansas. From these regional centers, interregional 
payments flowed primarily through New York banks. 
Table 3 presents an example of a correspondent network extending outward from a unit-
banking agricultural state, Mississippi, in the year 1929. Column (i) indicates that all banks in the 
state had at least one correspondent. The median, mean, and mode were three correspondents. 
The maximum was five. The most common set-up for an individual bank was to have one 
correspondent in the city containing the Federal Reserve Bank of their district (i.e. Atlanta for 
banks located in southern Mississippi, which lay in the 6
th District; and St. Louis for banks   11 
located in northern Mississippi, which lay in the 8
th District); one correspondent in a central 
reserve city, usually New York; and one correspondent in a commercial center outside of the 
state, often New Orleans. 
The correspondent banking system evolved during the nineteenth century. As early as 
1830, rural banks deposited reserve balances in metropolitan banks to facilitate the redemption of 
bank notes. In return for maintaining a minimum reserve deposit, metropolitan correspondents 
agreed to redeem their cumulative notes at par or a fixed discount (James and Weiman 2004 p. 
13). As banks evolved from suppliers of cash to deposit money, and as transactions shifted from 
currency to drafts to checks, the correspondent system kept pace. Checks drawn on a local 
bank’s correspondent account in New York or similar financial center became the most common 
medium for settling debts across communities. Providing correspondent services became the 
principal activity of the largest banks in national financial centers of New York and Chicago, 
where more than half of all deposits consisted of bankers’ balances, and was an increasingly 
important segment of the market in regional financial centers. Correspondent banks grew 
increasingly profitable, as correspondents used connections to client banks to market an ever 
growing array of financial services and as a basis for building branch, group, and chain banking 
systems. 
Correspondent banking expanded during the decades before the Great Depression, 
because the correspondent system had strengths relative to potential alternatives. The 
centralization of clearing and settlement services among money center banks yielded scale 
economies that reduced transaction costs and information externalities that reduced the risk of 
check transactions (James and Weiman 2004). The concentration of reserves in money center 
banks enabled the banking system as a whole to economize on reserve holdings, since banks   12 
could participate in an interbank domestic exchange market, where institutions bought or 
borrowed surplus correspondent balances, and thus, could buffer against transitory and seasonal 
flows of funds. This liquidity externality “diminished the volatility of domestic exchange rates in 
regional markets and lower[ed the] volatility of bankers’ balances in larger reserve cities,” 
making the banking system as a whole more stable and profitable (James and Weiman 2004 p. 
5). 
The correspondent banking system, however, also had weaknesses.
2 The first was a 
standard practice of all major correspondent banks. Clients could immediately count checks 
deposited as a portion of their reserves. The correspondent bank itself carried “the float.” 
It has long been recognized that the chief defense of the plan was its convenience. 
A country bank in this way knew how its reserve account stood. No checks were 
charged until the country bank remitted, and checks sent to the city correspondent 
were counted as available reserve as soon as put into the mail. In this way a 
fictitious reserve was created. A check in the mail for several days might later be 
returned for want of funds. All of this time the various banks that had handled it 
would count as reserve these unavailable funds (Preston 1920 p. 567). 
 
Regulatory authorities in all states approved of this long-standing practice, since its convenience 
seemed to offset potential disadvantages, such as allowing customers to write checks against 
uncollected funds. Moreover, “rural states adopted liberal bank incorporation laws that reduced 
minimum capital requirements to a fraction of the federal threshold and so spurred the formation 
of state-chartered banks in smaller cities and towns (James and Weiman 2004 p. 8).” 
These state regulations and common practices created a connection between 
correspondent clearing and bank reserves with perilous potential. Bank reserves in the 
correspondent system were inflated by a multiple of the volume of checks in transit. Each check 
                                                 
2  Advocates of Federal Reserve check clearing often criticized two additional features of the correspondent clearing 
system: first, the practice of exchange charges, which were fees charged for redeeming checks; and second, 
circuitous routing of checks, in order to avoid exchange charges. I do not focus on those problems, since they are 
orthogonal to the issues of this essay, and because the Federal Reserves’ drive to expand par territory alleviated 
these problems by the late 1920s.   13 
in transit counted was counted as part of the reserve of every bank through which it passed, until 
the check was redeemed, and the funds flowed backwards through the system, and the 
pyramiding unwound. Consider, for example, the case of a check sent by a textile factory in New 
England drawn on a Lowell bank with a Boston correspondent to a cotton-farmer in Alabama 
who deposited the check in his local bank with a Birmingham correspondent which routed the 
check through its New York correspondent on the way back to New England. At its peak, the 
value of the check would be added to the reserve account of the four banks through which it 
traveled: the local Alabama bank, its Birmingham correspondent, its New York correspondent, 
and the Boston correspondent. Meanwhile, the funds needed to pay the check remained within 
the merchants account at the Lowell Bank which counted those funds as part of its reserve. If all 
correspondent chains were this length, the total quantity of fictitious reserves in the 
correspondent system would be the value of all checks in transit multiplied by 4.
3 
Seasonal flows of funds from crop-growing regions exacerbated the situation. 
Agricultural states possessed large numbers of small rural banks that relied on correspondents to 
clear checks. Business for these banks peaked during the harvest and planting seasons, when 
farm lending, flows of crops, and flows of funds from cities to the hinterland peaked. During 
these periods, it would not be unusual for an institution in a small town to process checks equal 
to its required reserves within each week. If those checks took a week to clear through 
correspondents (also a typical period), then the bank’s possessed no actual reserves, since the 
                                                 
3  No source provides a figure or basis for determining this multiplier. It must have been at least one. Here, I provide 
a rough estimate. If the volume of checks in transit was constant, if all banks sent checks through the system via 
the most direct route to a correspondent which belonged either to the New York Clearing House or the Federal 
Reserve System, if all correspondents routed their checks through either the New York Clearing House or the 
Federal Reserve System, if the Mississippi correspondent network was representative of correspondent networks 
throughout the nation, and if funds returned at the same rate that checks moved through the system, then the 
multiplier would have been approximately 1.5. In other words, the aggregate funds actually available as reserves to 
correspondent banks, denoted A, would have been the A = B – (1.5)*F, where B was the amount of reserves that 
banks carried on their books and F was the float.   14 
‘float’ (a.k.a. fictitious reserves) exceeded the ‘reserves’ that they carried on their books. 
The growing number of banking chains and groups may have exacerbated the situation. A 
chain was a collection of independently chartered banks controlled by an individual or 
organization, usually through stock ownership or interlocking directorates. A group was a 
collection of independently chartered banks operating under the auspices of a corporate 
conglomerate. Each bank in the group had its own board of directors, but the holding company 
coordinated the activities of all the banks in the group and owned a majority of the capital stock 
in member banks. In chains and groups, the leading bank usually served as a correspondent for 
the other institutions, an arrangement which allowed chains and groups to economize on reserves 
and diversify risk across a diverse pool of assets. The presumed advantages of this arrangement 
may have been squandered by accounting conventions that overstated the reserves of the 
organization as a whole. These conventions obscured the true state of chains’ and groups’ 
financial health, confused management, and distorted incentives. In certain cases, according to 
contemporary accounts, these distortions induced management to artificially expand reserves by 
reciprocal clearing of checks, slowing the processing of checks in transit, and other arrangements 
that increased float, and thus reserves, without affecting real financial resources. 
For these reasons, the connection between clearing and reserves placed the correspondent 
system in a perilous position. A large portion of the reserves of the correspondent system 
consisted of ‘fictitious’ reserves equal to a multiple of the volume of checks in transit. The 
reserves of the correspondent system appeared to expand (but in reality did not change) 
whenever the volume of checks in transit or the length of correspondent chains (and thus the 
number of banks through which a check passed) increased. Any disruption of the clearing system 
that prevented the payment of checks forced the revelation of the fictitious reserves. An event,   15 
such as a banking panic, that forced banks to convert reserves into cash, would reveal that the 
much of the reserves in any correspondent chain consisted of fictitious figures based on the 
multiplication of the value of checks in transit. 
Precise data on the quantity of fictitious reserves does not exist, but extant sources yield 
closely related statistics. One is the ratio of checks in transit to bankers’ balances for state 
commercial banks. This is a lower bound for the share of reserves which were fictitious.
4 Figure 
1 displays the data for July 1 of each year from 1913 to 1940. The ratio peaked in 1930, when 
float approached 60% of bankers’ balances. This percentage was nearly twice the proportion 
prevailing during the preceding decade. The percentage was more than four times the proportion 
prevailing following the trough of the contraction.  
In 1913, in order to alleviate the problem of fictitious reserves, lower the costs of clearing 
checks, increase the efficiency of the payments system, and facilitate industry and commerce, 
Congress required “every federal reserve bank to receive on deposit, at par and without charge 
for exchange or collection, checks and drafts drawn upon any of its depositors (Federal Reserve 
Act 1913).” Congress authorized the Federal Reserve Board to make “regulations governing the 
transfer of funds at par among federal reserve banks, and authorized the Federal Reserve System 
to “exercise the functions of a clearing house for Federal Reserve member banks (Federal 
Reserve Act 1913).” In July 1916, the Federal Reserve’s system of check clearing initiated 
operations. Over the next five years, operations expanded rapidly, as the Federal Reserve 
modified services to make them more efficient, and legal changes required Fed member banks to 
clear their checks as directed by their Federal Reserve district. 
                                                 
4   The ratio which we measure is a lower bound because it includes figures from all state commercial banks, 
including members of the Federal Reserve System and members of clearing houses. Federal Reserve members 
cleared checks through the system, and thus, had much lower levels of checks in transit than non-member state 
banks. Clearing house banks, particularly in major money centers, also cleared checks more rapidly and credited 
them more slowly than banks that cleared via correspondents.   16 
  By the 1920s, the Federal Reserve’s check clearing system had matured. The Fed cleared 
checks both within and across districts. Each day, Federal Reserve members submitted the 
checks that they received to the nearest Federal Reserve office. The Fed office routed the checks 
directly to banks within its district and to the pertinent Federal Reserve district office for banks 
belonging to other districts. The Federal Reserve also accepted checks from non-member banks 
on the par list, which included about 90% of the banks in the nation. Banks on the par list paid at 
face value checks sent to them by the Federal Reserve. Most did so voluntarily, and in exchange, 
the Federal Reserve covered the costs of their efforts by supplying the necessary forms and pre-
printed and pre-posted envelopes. A few did so reluctantly, after the Federal Reserve hired local 
agents to redeem checks at the bank’s teller’s window, where the law required them to redeem 
checks at par. 
In cities with clearing houses, the pre-Federal-Reserve arrangements for clearing checks 
remained, albeit in a modified form. The clearing houses provided the machinery and experience 
necessary for handling tremendous volumes of transactions. The Federal Reserve decided, 
therefore, that it would not handle checks between banks located in the same clearing-house city, 
and it informed banks of this decision at the inauguration of its plan.  
In cities possessing both a clearing house and Federal Reserve branch, settlements of 
clearing house balances were made by debiting or crediting accounts on the books of the Federal 
Reserve branch, in which all members of the clearing house were required to keep deposits, even 
those that did not belong to the Federal Reserve System. In March 1917, New York adopted this 
system, and it spread swiftly to most cities boasting both clearing houses and Federal Reserve 
branches (Andres 1942 p. 595). During the 1920s, clearing houses in cities outside of Federal 
Reserve cities also began to adopt the practice of settling balances by transfers on the books of   17 
the Federal Reserve, by simply requiring clearing house members to open accounts at the Federal 
Reserve and telephoning or telegraphing the debits and credits to the Federal Reserve at the end 
of each business day (Andrews 1942 p. 596). 
In many cities possessing both clearing houses and Federal Reserve branches, closer 
cooperation evolved. Federal Reserve branches had a reason to belong to the local clearing 
house, since a Fed branch received numerous checks drawn on banks in its city, and the clearing 
house was the most convenient method of clearing them. Most clearing house associations 
admitted their local Federal Reserve branch, under special arrangements.  
“Customarily, the reserve bank has no vote or voice in the management of the 
association, is not subject to the examinations or reports often prescribed for the 
association members, and need not sign the constitution or articles of the 
association. Usually the [Federal Reserve] bank must help to bear the expenses of 
the association … [since] the reserve bank enjoys the clearing privilege, it is 
required to abide by the clearing rules, including such matters as time for 
exchanging items, form in which items are to be brought to the exchanges, time 
and manner of returns, and the like (Andrews 1942 pp. 606-607).” 
 
In some cities, the Federal Reserve took over the operation of the clearing house. For 
example since July 15, 1916, the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston furnished the 
equipment and paid the salaries of the clerks for the Boston Clearing House Association 
(Andrews 1942 p. 606). 
  The Federal Reserve cleared all other checks in a manner resembling the 
procedures employed by correspondent banks. The Federal Reserve shipped batches of 
checks to banks on which they were drawn, either via private messenger or the postal 
services, and awaited the return of funds (usually in the form of a draft drawn on an 
account of a Federal Reserve member or a money center bank) via the same means. The 
Federal Reserve and correspondent systems differed, however, in a crucial aspect. The 
Federal Reserve did not immediately credit out-of-town checks to the accounts of banks   18 
that deposited them. The Fed imposed a waiting period whose length was based on the 
typical length of time that it took for a check drawn on a type of bank in a particular 
location to remit funds. 
  The waiting periods varied up to eight business days depending on the distance 
involved and the type of bank on which the draft was drawn. The schedule of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York was the most expeditious. New York provided immediate 
credit for drafts deposited before 9 am and payable at New York City Clearing House 
Association Banks, Northern New Jersey Association Clearing House Banks, or certain 
other New York and Brooklyn banks. It also provided immediate credit for drafts drawn 
on its own members and certain warrants and obligations of the United States Treasury 
and the Federal Reserve System. It credited checks drawn on banks in east coast cities 
within one or two days, south eastern cities within three days, mid-western cities within 
four days, and San Francisco and Los Angeles within five days. Credit for items over 
$500 was delayed one day. The longest waiting period, of seven business days, pertained 
to drafts drawn on banks in western and Pacific states that belonged neither to a clearing 
house nor the Federal Reserve System.
5 
   
Section 2: Sources of Data 
The previous section describes the payment systems operating on the eve of the Great 
Depression. The descriptions is based on the professional and academic literature of the era, 
information available in bankers’ handbooks and manuals, and contemporary sources widely 
available at the time and often employed by economists pondering the causes and consequences 
of the depression. Data on clearing houses, reserve cities, reserve requirements, and 
                                                 
5   See Rand McNally Bankers’ Directory for a complete recapitulation of each Federal Reserve banks’ time 
schedule for crediting deposits.   19 
correspondent linkages comes, for example, from Rand McNally’s Bankers Directory. 
The remainder of this essay is based on a new and unique source. During the 1920s, the 
Federal Reserve Board of Governors developed a lexicon for discussing bank suspensions and 
procedures for collecting data on the phenomenon. They preserved their conclusions on the St. 
6386 series of forms. This section concisely characterizes the terms that the Federal Reserve 
devised to describe the causes of banks suspensions. Richardson (2005) delves into details of the 
definitions and the data collection process. 
In the Federal Reserve’s lexicon, a suspension was a bank that closed its doors to 
depositors and ceased conducting normal banking business for at least one business day. Some, 
but not all, suspended banks reopened for business. A liquidation was a permanent suspension. A 
liquidating bank closed its doors to the public, surrendered its charter, and repaid depositors, 
usually under the auspices of a court appointed officer known as a receiver. A voluntary 
liquidation was a category of closure in which banks ceased operations and rapidly arranged to 
repay depositors the full value of their deposits. Voluntary liquidations did not require the 
services of receivers and were not classified as suspensions. A consolidation (or merger) was the 
corporate union of two or more banks into one bank which continued operations as a single 
business entity and under a single charter. The categories of bank distress were typically 
construed to be temporary suspensions, terminal suspensions (i.e. liquidations), voluntary 
liquidations, and consolidations due to financial difficulties.
6 
The Federal Reserve attributed most bank suspensions to one of five common causes. 
The first was slow, doubtful, or worthless paper. The term worthless paper indicated an asset 
with little or no value. The term doubtful paper meant an asset unlikely to yield book value. The 
                                                 
6   Contemporary publications often employed the terms failure and closure as synonyms, which typically (but not 
universally) referred to the sum of temporary and terminal suspensions.   20 
term slow paper meant an asset likely to yield full value in time, but whose repayment lagged or 
which could not be converted to full cash value at short notice. The second common cause of 
suspension was heavy withdrawals, the typical example being a bank run. The third was failure a 
banking correspondent. Correspondents were banks with ongoing relationships facilitated by 
deposits of funds. A typical example is a county bank (the client) which kept its reserve deposits 
within and cleared its checks through a national bank in a reserve city (the correspondent). The 
fourth common cause was mismanagement. The fifth was defalcation, a monetary deficiency in 
the accounts of a bank due to fraud or breach of trust.  
Table 4 summarizes the data by presenting numbers of banks failing for different reasons 
during each year. In the table, row (a) indicates the total number of banks suspending operations 
due to problems with assets and liabilities. Imbalances often arose on one side of the balance 
sheet, but could arise simultaneously on both sides. Rows (a.1) through (a.5) display the possible 
combinations: (a.1) slow, doubtful, or worthless assets listed as the primary cause of suspension; 
(a.2) assets listed as the primary cause and heavy withdrawals listed as a contributing cause; (a.3) 
both withdrawals and assets listed as primary causes; (a.4) heavy withdrawals listed as the 
primary cause and assets as the contributing cause; and (a.5) withdrawals alone as the primary 
cause of suspension. Row (b) indicates the number of banks suspending due to the closure of a 
correspondent. Row (c) indicates the number of banks suspending due to defalcations, 
mismanagement, excessive loans to officers and directors, excessive investment in building and 
facilities, and similar circumstances. Row (d) indicates the number of banks suspending due to 
other or multiple causes. The latter consists in part of complex cases which do not fit into the 
mutually exclusive categories above, often because they spanned two or more classifications. An 
example is a poorly managed bank which failed to enforce collections on its slow farm loans and   21 
which experienced runs after local newspapers revealed that its president embezzled funds from 
savings accounts 
  In Table 4, several patterns appear prominent. The share of suspensions due primarily to 
problems on the asset side of the balance sheet fell through 1931, rose in 1932, and fell again in 
1933. The share of suspensions due primarily to withdrawals rose through 1931, fell in 1932, and 
rose again in 1933. The ratio of assets over withdrawals varied over time. Withdrawals’ role in 
the collapse of the banking system peaked in 1931, while before and after, asset problems caused 
the majority of suspensions. The share of suspensions due to defalcation and mismanagement fell 
throughout the depression, perhaps because corrupt and poorly-managed institutions lacked the 
resources needed to weather the initial states of the storm. The share of suspensions due to the 
closure of correspondents peaked during 1930. 
    Figure 2 examines the data from a different perspective. It indicates the share of 
suspensions due to correspondents, withdrawals, and assets for the depression as a whole. The 
left-hand pie chart presents data for banks which suspended operations temporarily. The right-
hand pie chart presents data for banks which suspended operations permanently. The shades of 
gray indicate the percentage of banks suspending for different reasons. The color black denotes 
banks which suspended solely due to heavy withdrawals (in key, WITHDRAWALS) but which 
were in fine financial shape before depositors’ demanded repayment of deposits. Most of these 
banks experienced sudden and severe runs. Three-quarters gray denotes banks forced out of 
operations by heavy withdrawals and also afflicted by asset troubles that exacerbated their 
condition, but which were not severe enough to have necessitated suspension in the absence of 
withdrawals (WITHDRAWAL + assets). One-half gray indicates banks in double trouble. 
Problems severe enough to necessitate suspension existed on both sides of the balance sheet   22 
(WITHDRAWALS & ASSETS). One-quarter gray indicates banks whose slow, doubtful, and 
worthless assets forced them to close their doors and where withdrawals exacerbated the 
situation. Examples include (i) banks forced by continuous, slow withdrawals to sell their 
profitable assets leaving them with a problematic portfolio, and (ii) banks headed towards failure 
whose demise was accelerated by depositors’ demands (ASSETS + withdrawals). Lightly-dotted 
gray indicates banks forced to suspend solely due to problematic assets (ASSETS). 
  Figure 2 demonstrates that for the contraction as a whole, asset problems were the 
primary cause of about half of all bank liquidations (i.e. terminal suspensions) and a contributing 
cause of another one-quarter. About five in ten of the banks which went out of business, in other 
words, had asset problems severe enough to have caused their demise. For temporary 
suspensions, the pattern was different. Temporary suspensions appear to have been issues of 
illiquidity. Banks suspended operations temporarily when they lacked enough cash on hand to 
satisfy the demands of depositors. Heavy withdrawals were the primary cause of more than a half 
of all temporary suspensions. The closure of counterparties caused a sixth of all temporary 
suspensions. 
 
Section 3: Correspondent Networks and the Initial Panic of the Depression 
  The correlation between suspensions and the closure of correspondents was particularly 
pronounced during the initial banking panic of the depression. Figure 3 plots the number of 
suspensions each week due to the closure of correspondents (and for sake of comparison also 
plots total changes due to financial distress). The typical week witnessed few, if any, suspensions 
from this source. The weekly mode and median were zero. The weekly number rose during July 
of 1929, when a Mediterranean fruit fly epidemic produced a banking panic in Florida, and the 
suspension of banks in Tampa, which served as the principal correspondents for banks in central   23 
Florida, forced the banks to suspend operations throughout the region, but remained near zero 
until November 1930, when it spiked sharply upwards.  
In a two week period, more than 120 banks were forced to suspend operations due to the 
closure of their correspondents. The event is an obvious outlier. Never before or since have so 
many financial institutions fallen in a counterparty cascade. It does not seem surprising that this 
event, the worst chain reaction in United States financial history, marked the onset of the worst 
period of bank distress and most catastrophic financial contraction in United States financial 
history. In the immediate aftermath, bank runs radiated from the locus of the counterparty 
cascade, forcing hundreds of banks to close their doors to depositors. 
  Figure 4 examines the event in more detail. Figure 4 uses the shading scheme of Figure 2 
to portray the cause of suspensions during the fall of 1930 and winter of 1931, a period which 
witnessed the initial surge of bank suspensions during the Great Depression. Before mid-
October, the pattern of bank suspensions resembled the pattern of failures throughout the 1920s. 
Banks failed at a steady rate. The principal cause was problems with asset quality. The pattern 
changed dramatically in November 1930, when the rate of suspension rose suddenly. The closure 
of correspondents caused the initial increase. Thereafter, runs (or fear of runs) forced scores of 
banks to close their doors, and adverse circumstances pushed many weak banks into insolvency. 
Comments written on the St. 6386 forms tell the tale.
7 On November 7, the Bank of 
Tennessee (Nashville, TN) closed due to “depreciation in the value of securities” and 
irregularities which left it with “bills payable of $2,887,100.00” and debts “on real estate of 
                                                 
7   The archival evidence attributes the suspension of the principal banks controlled by Caldwell conglomerate to 
either: (a) financial difficulties directly attributed to Caldwell’s demise, or (b) runs because of the banks known 
connection to Caldwell and Company. The archival evidence attributes the suspension of nearly 100 additional 
banks to: (a) the severing of correspondent links to institutions, such as the Bank of Tennessee, controlled by the 
Caldwell conglomerate, (b) runs due to known affiliations with the Caldwell organization, or (3) runs due to 
geographic proximity to Caldwell controlled institutions or geographic proximity to banks undergoing runs.   24 
$260,079.20” on a deposit base of $10,000,000.
8 In the following week, heavy withdrawals 
forced many banks in the city to suspend operations. On November 12, the Holston-Union 
National Bank (Knoxville, TN) closed due to heavy withdrawals “due to loss of confidence 
caused by failure of banks in Nashville” and the frozen state of its assets. 
On November 17, armageddon arrived. The National Bank of Kentucky (Louisville, KY) 
suspended operations because of “heavy withdrawals and affiliation with the Caldwell Chain.” 
The closure forced its affiliate, the Louisville Trust Company, to suspend operations on the same 
day. During the next week, eleven clients of the national bank suspended operations, as did four 
clients of the trust company. An additional client closed its doors soon thereafter. The Federal 
Reserve attributed the suspension of all of those clients to the severance of the correspondent-
client linkage. 
The American Exchange Trust Company (Little Rock, Arkansas) also suspended 
operations due to “heavy withdrawals due to rumors caused by failure of Caldwell and Company 
[in] Nashville.” The American Exchange Trust Company was the lead bank in the A. B. Banks 
chain and one of the principal correspondent institutions in Arkansas and the surrounding states. 
Its suspension forced 37 of its clients to suspend operations immediately. Another five suspended 
operations during the following week. Some of those clients – notably the Arkansas Trust 
Company (Newport, AR) and the Merchants and Planters Bank and Trust (Pine Bluff, AR) – had 
clients of their own, which suspended operations in turn. 
One client of the American Exchange Trust Company remained in operation for a month. 
The Citizens Bank and Trust Company (Harrison, AR) endured by calling on the resources of the 
A. T. Hudsputh Chain, for which it was the principal bank. But on December 17, when those 
                                                 
8   This quotation contains all of the information necessary to locate the cited text in the central subject file of the 
Board of Governors in the National Archives. The appendix describes how to locate the original sources.   25 
resources ran thin and the loss of funds on deposit in the American Exchange Trust Company 
appeared irreversible, the Citizens Bank threw in the towel. Within 24 hours, its suspension 
caused seven of its client banks and the remaining members of the A. T. Hudsputh chain to 
suspend operations.  
 Similar events occurred in Illinois, where correspondent chains without connection to 
Caldwell collapsed. On November 8, Quincy-Ricker National Bank and Trust Company 
(Quincy, IL) suspended operations due to the collapse its largest borrower, the “Smith and 
Ricker Land and Cattle Company, of Kansas City, Missouri.” Its suspension soon forced four of 
its client banks to close their doors. During the following week, deposits fell steadily at banks in 
the vicinity. On November 14, cash reserves of the State, Savings, Loan, and Trust Company 
(Quincy, IL) ran out. It suspended operations. In the next three days, six of its client banks also 
closed. Three more did so during the next month. The effects of these suspensions spread across 
state lines. On November 20, the Hannibal Trust Company (Hannibal, MO) suspended 
operations due to “heavy withdrawals due to closing of a number of banks in their section at 
Quincy, Illinois.” The closing of the Hannibal Trust Company forced one of its clients, the 
Farmers Bank (Oakwood, MO), to suspend operations later that afternoon.  
Similar dominoes of collapsing correspondent networks radiated out from Sioux City, 
Iowa and Clarksdale and Tupelo, Mississippi during December, 1930. On December 6, both the 
Sioux City National Bank and the First National Bank in Sioux City suspended operations due to 
“slow, doubtful, or worthless paper.” Two days later, the Leeds Bank of Sioux City, a client of 
the former, closed its doors. On December 12, the Exchange Bank of Marcus, a client of the 
latter, ceased operations. On December 17, another client of the latter, The Alvord Bank (Alvord, 
IA) suspended operations. This was one of the four banks in the Charles Shade chain. The   26 
remaining banks of the chain (located in Inkwood, Larchwood, and Rock Rapids, IA) suspended 
operations at the same time. On December 24, the Peoples Bank and Trust Company (Tupelo, 
MS) suspended operations due to “excessive bills payable” and “slow, doubtful, and worthless 
assets.” Its branches at Nettleton and Rienzi closed concurrently. During the next 24 hours, its 
suspension forced six state banks for which it served as correspondent, located in the towns of 
Fulton, Guntown, Saltillo, Shannon, Sherman, and Verona, to suspend operations. On December 
1930, the Planters National Bank in Clarksdale suspended operations, forcing two of its clients 
into suspension and inducing banks in neighboring towns to suspended operations for fear of 
runs. 
Section 4: Correspondent-Clearing and Bank Closures during 1931 and 1932 
  The previous section showed that the collapse of correspondent-clearing networks 
triggered the initial banking crisis in the fall of 1930. This section shows correspondent clearing 
networks played a role in later local and regional panics. An example is the surge in bank 
suspensions in Illinois in the spring of 1931, an event that Friedman and Schwartz (1963) named 
the Second Banking Crisis. The Federal Reserve attributed only three suspensions in this panic 
directly to closures of correspondents. One of the suspensions was in Florida, one in Nebraska, 
and one in North Carolina, all far from the locus of suspensions in Illinois.  
Yet, Federal Reserve agents indicated that of the 25 banks which suspended in Chicago 
between June 6
th and 10
th, eleven belonged to the John Bain Group, seven belonged to the 
Foreman Group, and one belonged to the Ralph E. Ballou and E. L. Wagner Group. For almost 
all of those suspensions, the Federal Reserve determined heavy withdrawals to have been the 
primary cause and slow or frozen assets to have been a contributing cause. The same was true of 
almost all other suspensions in Illinois and adjacent states. Federal Reserve agents stated   27 
laconically on most of the forms that the bank closed its doors after depleting its cash reserves. 
These comments suggest an epidemic of illiquidity plagued these banks. Depositors wanted cash. 
The banks’ assets were frozen. The banks closed because they could not meet depositors’ 
demands. 
Each of these banking groups was a collection of independently chartered institutions 
operating under the auspices of a corporate conglomerate, which owned a majority of the capital 
stock in each of the banks, and by appointing directors and hiring managers, controlled their 
affairs. The leading bank of each of these groups served as the correspondent for the subordinate 
institutions. The groups were relatively recent innovations. They had grown during the preceding 
decade, as correspondent banks in Chicago expanded their businesses by absorbing responding 
institutions. 
 Table 5 examines the relationship between clearing systems and bank closure for the 
contraction as a whole. The table indicates the number of banks that suspended operations 
temporarily and terminally in three groups: first, banks that cleared checks solely through 
correspondents; second, banks that belonged to clearing houses (but not the Federal Reserve 
System); and third, banks that belonged to the Federal Reserve System (including those that also 
belonged to clearing houses). The table shows that the preponderance of banks that suspended 
operations cleared checks via correspondents. About a fifth belonged to the Federal Reserve 
System. Only a small fraction belonged to clearing houses. 
Across these groups, the percentage of banks that suspended operations temporarily or 
terminally varied. Over one-third of all banks that cleared checks via correspondents suspended 
operations at some point during the depression, and over one-fourth permanently ceased 
operations before the banking holidays began in March 1933. These rates were four times higher   28 
than those of clearing-house members and two-and-one half times larger than those of Federal 
Reserve members. The failure of the later two types was concentrated during the three months 
following Britain’s abandonment of the gold standard in the fall of 1931, to which the Federal 
Reserve reacted by contracting the money supply and raising interest rates. That reaction 
changed fundamentals in a way which burdened money center banks. So did later periods of 
contractionary policy. Outside of those periods, banks that cleared checks via correspondents 
failed at rates much higher than banks which cleared checks through clearing houses or the 
Federal Reserve. 
These raw correlations do not, of course, reveal why banks that cleared via 
correspondents failed at such high rates. Banks that cleared via correspondents differed from 
clearing-house and Fed-member banks along many dimensions, such as location, size, 
investment opportunities, customer base, regulatory environment, access to the discount window, 
and management expertise. Those dimensions undoubtedly influenced banks’ prospects for 
success (or failure). Determining which was the most important requires the collection of 
additional data and the development of techniques to separate the effects of check-clearing 
contagion from other factors. 
 
Section 5: Conclusion 
 
  The correspondent check clearing system played a hitherto unrecognized role in the 
collapse of the banking system during the contraction of the early 1930s. The initial banking 
crisis began when a correspondent system in the center of the United States imploded, causing 
the closure of more than one hundred institutions. Panic radiated from the locus of events, as 
bank runs spread throughout the Mississippi, Missouri, and Ohio River watersheds, and 
additional correspondent networks succumbed to the situation. The second banking crisis began   29 
when depositors simultaneously withdrew large sums from several banking groups in northern 
Illinois. These banking groups were correspondent networks whose leading institutions had 
gradually taken control of their client banks during the 1920s. For the entire contraction, banks 
that relied upon correspondents to clear checks failed at much higher rates than banks which 
cleared via clearing houses or the Federal Reserve. 
  Correspondent networks were always vulnerable to counter-party cascades. The 
institutions formed a line like dominoes. One bank held deposits for another bank, which in turn, 
held deposits for a third. These deposits comprised the preponderance of the dominoes’ reserves 
(both required and excess). When one domino toppled, the reserves of the next domino 
disappeared, and it suspended operations also, which forced additional dominoes to fall. 
  Accounting conventions employed by correspondent banks exacerbated the situation. 
Banks that cleared via correspondents counted checks in transit as part of their reserves. This 
convention exaggerated on paper the resources available to individual institutions and the system 
as a whole in reality. Banks’ balance sheets indicated that they possessed abundant reserves, 
when in reality, they possessed few, if any, resources. The summer and fall of 1930 witnessed 
the historical peak in the accumulation of these fictitious reserves. The panics that began in 
October of that year forced the revelation of banks’ reserve positions. Simultaneous revelation 
revealed the cancer lurking within the correspondent system. In such circumstances, it is no 
wonder that the system collapsed so suddenly and so extensively. 
  Banks that belonged to the Federal Reserve System and clearing houses did not suffer 
such circumstances. The Federal Reserve processed drafts quicker and credited accounts slower 
than did correspondent banks. Their clients did not accumulate fictitious reserves. Their 
accounting conventions did not conceal the true state of their client’s (and their own) reserve   30 
positions. This difference is likely to be one reason that Federal Reserve and clearing house 
members faired better than other banks during the initial years of the contraction.  
   31 
Table 1 






















































































































































































































































  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)      (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
                                 
Alabama    1    1  4  17  37    New Hampshire          1  4  13 
Arizona          2  9  12    New Jersey          8  66  100 
Arkansas    1    1  3  16  21    New York  1  1  1  1  11  85  328 
California  1  1    3  24  111  202    North Carolina    1    1  9  35  46 
Colorado    1    2  3  22  31    North Dakota          5  15  21 
                                 
Connecticut          1  30  61    Ohio  1  1    4  17  107  168 
Delaware          1  8  16    Oklahoma    1    2  7  29  50 
Florida    1    1  7  28  63    Oregon    1    1  3  16  39 
Georgia  1      2  13  41  75    Pennsylvania  1  1    2  34  243  419 
Idaho          3  6  9    Rhode Island          1  9  16 
                                 
Illinois  1    1  1  15  214  321    South Carolina          9  32  47 
Indiana        1  14  92  165    South Dakota          4  13  19 
Iowa        4  13  71  97    Tennessee    2    2  5  30  58 
Kansas        3  11  91  106    Texas  1  3    7  16  81  130 
Kentucky    1    1  5  27  48    Utah    1    2  3  15  24 
                                 
Louisiana    1    1  1  9  13    Virginia  1      1  5  27  53 
Maine          2  12  15    Washington, D.C.        1  1  37  44 
Maryland          3  30  64    Washington    2      6  26  80 
Massachusetts  1      1  8  56  134    West Virginia          2  18  23 
Michigan    1    2  12  56  111    Wisconsin        1  11  96  117 
                                 
Minnesota  1      2  11  89  123    Wyoming          2  5  6 
Mississippi          7  19  27                   
Missouri  2      3  12  106  185                   
Montana    1    1  3  11  12                   
Nebraska    1    2  6  26  56    United States  12  24  2  57  349  2,186  3,805 
                                 
 
Source: Rand McNally Bankers’ Directory, July 1930 
 
Notes: Column (1) indicates the number of Federal Reserve District Banks in the state. Column (2) indicates 
the number of Federal Reserve Branch Banks. Column (5) indicates the number of cities with clearing houses. 
Column (6) indicates the number of banks belonging to clearing houses. Column (7) indicates the number of 
banks located in cities containing clearing houses.   32 
 
Table 2 
Clearing Houses with Examination Bureaus 
By Region and City Characteristics, 1930 
 
 











































































































                            
 New England              North Central             
 Boston  MA    1  1     Chicago  IL  1  1   
 New Haven  CN            Indianapolis  IN    1     
               Cleveland  OH    1 1   
               Columbus  OH    1     
 Mid Atlantic              Detroit  MI    1  1 
 Newark  NJ            LaCrosse  WI           
 New York  NY  1   1     Milwaukee  WI    1     
 Philadelphia  PA    1  1                  
               Plains and Mountains             
               Hutchinson  KS           
 South Central            Kansas City  KS    1     
 Louisville  KY    1   1    Wichita  KS    1     
 Kansas City   MO    1  1     Minneapolis  MN    1 1   
 St. Louis  MO    1  1     St. Paul  MN    1     
               Denver  CO    1  1 
                            
 South              Pacific             
 Montgomery  AL            Los Angeles  CA    1  1 
 New Orleans  LA    1   1  Pasadena  CA           
 Oklahoma City  OK    1   1  Portland  OR    1  1 
 Tulsa  OK    1       Ogden  UT    1     
 Nashville  TN    1   1  Salt Lake City  UT    1  1 
             Seattle  WA    1  1 
                      
  
Source: Rand McNally Bankers’ Directory, July 1930 
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Table 3  
Correspondents of Banks in Mississippi, 1929 
 
    Location of Correspondent     
    MS    St. Louis    Atlanta      Total 
#     
Other  
States    6
th  8
th    6




York     
    (a)  (b)    (c)  (d)    (e)  (f)    (g)  (h)    (i) 
                             
0    199  7    101  15    3  62    93  104     
1    91  56    34  79    54  87    189  197    20 
2    18  85    6  69    64  20    27  9    69 
3    2  76      6    19      1      111 
4      83          1            106 
5      4                      4 
                             
N    310  310    141  169    141  169    310  310    310 
 
Source: Rand McNally Bankers’ Directory 
 
Notes: Each column indicates the number of banks in Mississippi which 
reported 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 correspondents in the designated area. Column 
(a), for example, indicates that 199 banks in Mississippi possessed no 
correspondents in the state and 2 banks in Mississippi possessed 3 
correspondents in the state. Column (b) indicates the number of 
correspondent located in states other than Mississippi. Column (c) 
indicates the number of correspondents in St. Louis, which contained the 
headquarters of the 8
th Federal Reserve District, possessed by banks 
located in the 6
th Federal Reserve District portion of Mississippi. Column 
(d) indicates the same number for banks located in the 8
th District portion 
of Mississippi. Column (e) and (f) indicate the number of correspondents 
in Atlanta, which contained the headquarters of the 6
th Federal Reserve 
District, possessed by banks in the 6
th and 8
th District respectively. 
Column (g) indicates the number of correspondents in New Orleans. 
Column (h) indicates the number of correspondents in New York. Column 
(i) indicates the total number of correspondents in all areas.  34 
Table 4 
Causes of Suspensions 
January 1929 to March 1933 
 
Causes of Suspensions  1929  1930  1931  1932  1933  Total 
             
(a) Assets and Liabilities  242  848  1720  1125  337  4272 
(a.1) Assets  102  316  457  354  91  1320 
(a.2) Assets (p) and withdrawals (c)  44  142  294  250  61  791 
(a.3) Assets (p) and withdrawals (p)  16  71  163  74  22  346 
(a.4) Withdrawals (p) and assets (c)  38  145  487  294  116  1080 
(a.5) Withdrawals  42  174  319  153  47  735 
(b) Closure of correspondent  28  140  97  68  24  357 
(c) Defalcation and mismanagement  143  153  159  76  16  547 
(d) Other and multiple causes  90  215  298  193  91  887 
             
Total  503  1356  2274  1462  468  6063 
 
Note: Statistics for 1933 include only the months January through March. Figures do 
not include banks closed due to government proclamations, moratoria, or banking 
holidays. Rows (a.1.1) through (a.1.5) indicate subtotals of line (a.1).  
 
Source: Richardson (2005).  
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Table 5 
Temporary and Terminal Suspensions by Clearing System and Year 
January 1929 to March 1933 
 
    Correspondent    Clearing    Federal Reserve     
    Term.  Temp.    Term.  Temp.    Term.  Temp.     
    (a)  (b)    (c)  (d)    (e)  (f)     
                       
1929    366  62    3  0    64  7     
1930    874  241    37  6    169  21     
1931    1,461  224    72  10    432  74     
1932    976  133    37  2    290  27     
1933    326  41    11  1    83  2     
                       
Total    4,003  701    160  19    1,038  131     
                       
# 1929    14,080    2,183    8,707     
                       
% Suspended    33.4%    8.2%    11.9%     
% Failed    28.4%    7.3%    13.4%     
                       
 
Source: Rand McNally Bankers’ Directory, Historical Statistics of the United 
States, and National Archives and Records Administration. See data appendix 
and Richardson (2005) for details of NARA data. 
 
Notes: Columns headed “Term” indicate the number of terminal 
suspensions. Columns headed “Temp” indicate the number of temporary 
suspensions. Figures for 1933 include only banks that failed preceding the 
banking holiday. The row “# 1929” indicates the number of banks of that 
type in operation on June 30, 1929. The row “% Failed” indicates the 
percentage of banks of that type in operation at the beginning of the 
depression that suspended operations terminally before the banking holiday 
in 1933. The row “% Suspended” indicates the percentage of banks of that 
type suspended operations either temporarily or terminally before the 
banking holiday.  
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Figure 1 
Checks in Transit as a Share of Bankers’ Balance for State Commercial Banks 































Checks in Transit (Float)
Bankers'  Balances (including reserves)
Ratio
Source: Board of Governors, All Bank Statistics, Table A-3, p. 43, 1959. 
 
Notes: The series were constructed using data from June 30 of each year or the nearest available 






































Note: The pie charts above display the proportion of suspensions occurring between January 
1929 and March 1933 attributed to the 6 causes listed above. Suspensions attributed to 
defalcation, mismanagement, multiple, and other causes were excluded from the calculations. 
The proportions of suspensions attributed to those causes were roughly equal. 
 
Source: Richardson (2005). 
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Figure 3 







































Source: Richardson (2005).  39 
 
Figure 4 






















































Source: Richardson (2005).  
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